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WASHINGTON CASE LAW-1960
free of termites. The Florida court took the position that an independ-
ent examination should have been made by the purchaser despite these
representations, even to the extent of breaking into stucco walls.
In the cases above referred to, the proposition reflected in the Obde
case, that concealed defects dangerous to health, life or property im-
pose a duty of disclosure upon a vendor of real property, was not dis-
cussed. However, the argument has been pursued successfully in a line
of Kentucky cases, culminating in Kaze v. Compton. °
The holding in the Obde case appears to emphasize a Willingness on
the part of the court to transcend the traditional limitations on liability
for nondisclosure in arm's length transactions. The case, if viewed as
being limited to its facts, stands only for imposition of a duty on the
part of a vendor to disclose to a prospective purchaser of real property
the presence of non-apparent termite infestations, such infestations
constituting per se defects which are dangerous to life, health or prop-
erty. The case might be viewed, however, as a concrete manifestation
of the court's ability to place liability where considerations of fair
dealing indicate it should lie, by the mechanism of labeling specific
factual patterns arising in the vendor-purchaser interchange as consti-
tuting conditions dangerous to life, health or property. The practi-
tioner confronted with a purchaser-client who has been defrauded
through silence might well investigate the possibility of utilizing the
danger-to-property route to recovery.
ViRGiNiA Lyxss
TRUSTS
Doctrine of Cy Pres-General Charitable Intent. In the recent
case of Puget Sound Nat'l Bank v. Easterday1 the Washington Su-
preme Court, for the first time, applied the doctrine of judicial cy pres.
The doctrine provides that
If property is given in trust to be applied to a particular charitable
purpose, and it is or becomes impossible or impracticable or illegal to
carry out the particular purpose, and if the settlor manifested a more
general intention to devote the property to charitable purposes, the
trust will not fail but the court will direct the application of the prop-
erty to some charitable purpose which falls within the general chari-
table intention of the settlor.2
In the Puget Sound case, the testator provided in his will that a cer-
20 283 S.W2d 204 (Ky. Ct. App. 1955).
1155 Wash. Dec. 898, 350 P2d 444 (1960).
2 RESTATEMNT (SEcoND), TRuSTS § 399 (1959).
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tain portion of his estate be given in trust to the plaintiff for the fol-
lowing use:
To each patient that is discharged from the White Shield Home of
Tacoma, after my death, I desire to give a sum not to exceed $150.00,
the amount to be given to be determined by the Management of said
Home and approved by my executors. In the event that the said Home
should be discontinued or for any other reason the Trust can not be
literally carried out I direct that the French rule and doctrine of
Cy-Pris [sic] be invoked.'
Commencing in 1940, patients of the home (unwed mothers in their
first pregnancy) began receiving assistance. In 1956, the home ceased
operation. Thereafter, the plaintiff instituted a declaratory judgment
action against all of the heirs of the testator, the home and the attorney
general' for the purpose of having the will construed. The trial court
invoked the doctrine of cy pres and declared that the trust funds be
used for the benefit of patients of three particular homes in King
County which were of a similar nature to the home which was discon-
tinued. The trial court further declared that only patients of the three
homes who were unwed, in their first pregnancy and residents of Pierce
County would be eligible to receive the benefits of the trust fund.
Affirming, the supreme court stated:
The doctrine applies in situations where a testator has evidenced a
dominant intent to devote his property to some charitable use but the
circumstances are such that it becomes impossible to follow the partic-
ular method he directs, and the courts then sanction its use in some
other way which will, as nearly as may be, approximate his general
intent.... and that doctrine will be applied only where the court finds
in the terms of the will, read in light of surrounding circumstances, a
general intent to devote the property to a charitable use, to which the
intent that it go to the particular organizaion named is secondary. '
(Emphasis in original.)
On two previous occasions6 the court mentioned the doctrine of judi-
cial cy pres but refused to apply it. Since this is a case of first impres-
3 Puget Sound Nat'l Bank v. Easterday, 155 Wash. Dec. 898, 901, 350 P.2d 444, 445(1960).
4 Since the community is interested in the enforcement of charitable trusts, the
attorney general can enforce such a trust and is a necessary party to suits involving
failure of a charitable trust. Kenney Presbyterian Home v. State, 174 Wash. 19, 24
P.2d 403 (1933) ; RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS § 391 (1959).
5 Puget Sound Nat'l Bank v. Easterday, 155 Wash. Dec. 898, 909, 350 P.2d 444,
450 (1960), quoting from Duncan v. Higgins, 129 Conn. 136, 26 A.2d 849 (1942).
6 Townsend v. Charles Schalkenbach Home for Boys, Inc., 33 Wn.2d 255, 205 P.2d
345 (1949) ; Horton v. Board of Educ. of Methodist Protestant Church, 32 Wn.2d 99,
201 P.2d 163 (1948).
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sion, some consideration of the background of the doctrine will be
helpful.
The words "cy pres" are of French origin and mean "as near as."7
The origin of the doctrine of cy pres is not entirely dear, but a form of
cy pres apparently existed in Rome prior to the time that Christianity
became the official religion of the Roman Empire.' In England, the
basis for development of the doctrine seems to have been the religious
beliefs in vogue in the 15th century. It was believed that charitable
donations were almost a necessary prerequisite to a peaceful hereafter.
The purpose of such donations was to cleanse the soul.' If it was im-
possible to uphold the particular charitable donation, the donation
could be used for another charitable purpose. A person's soul could be
cleansed just as readily by applying the fund to one charity as another
and the settlor's eternal welfare should not be impaired by allowing
the donation to fail.1
The English courts recognized two types of cy pres: prerogative and
judicial. Under the doctrine of prerogative cy pres, the King, as parens
patriae, was permitted to apply the property to any charitable purpose
he might select if the object of the intended gift was illegal 1 or if a
gift was made to charity generally without the interposition of a trus-
tee." There was no duty resting upon the sovereign to consider the
intent of the settlor and the property might be devoted to a purpose
entirely contrary to the settlor's purpose. This type of cy pres has been
expressly rejected in Washington"3 and according to the leading au-
thorities in the field does not exist in this country. However, there is
some language in case authority to the contrary.14
In the Pu get Sound case, the defendant contended that the trial
court had applied prerogative cy pres, in that the recipients of the
7 BLACx, LAW DICTIONARY 464 (4th ed. 1951).8 Late Corporation of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United
States, 136 U.S. 1 (1889), citing DIGEST OF JUSTINIAN, lib. 33, tit. 2, law 16.9 Willard, Illustrations of the Origin of Cy Pres, 8 HARv. L Rav. 69, 79, 91 (1894).
10 FiscH, THE CY PREs DOCTRINE IN THE UNITED STATES § 1.03 (1950) ; Comment,
49 YALE L.J. 303, 309 (1939).
11 Da Costa v. De Pas, 1 Amb. 228 (Ch. 1754).
12 FIscH, THE CY PREs DOCTRINE IN THE UNITED STATES § 2.03 at 57 (1950).
13 Reagh v. Dickey, 183 Wash. 564, 48 P.2d 941 (1935); In. re Chellew's Estate,
127 Wash. 382, 221 Pac. 3 (1923).
14 E.g., "If it should be conceded that a case like the present one transcends the
ordinary jurisdiction of the court of chancery, and requires for its determination the
interposition of the parens patriae of the state, it may then be contended that, in this
country, there is no royal person to act as parens patriae, and to give direction for the
application of charities which cannot be administered by the court. It is true we have
no such chief magistrate. But here the legislature is the parents patriae, and, unless
restrained by constitutional limitations, possesses all the powers in this regard which
the sovereign possesses in England." Late Corporation of the Church of Jesus Christ
of Latter-Day Saints v. United States, 136 U.S. 1, 56 (1889).
19611
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
benefits of the trust were three King County homes, whereas the
original recipient had been a Pierce County home. 5 But as the court
properly pointed out:
The patients of the institutions are the beneficiaries and not the insti-
tutions themselves. . . . Under the judgment of the trial court, the
beneficiaries will continue to be unwed mothers pregnant with their
first child.... The purpose of the trust remains the same. 16 (Empha-
sis in original.)
Recognizing then that only judicial cy pres exists in this jurisdiction,
the prerequisites necessary to permit its application must be consid-
ered. One of the problems encountered is searching out a manifesta-
tion of general charitable intent. If the particular purpose for which
the trust was created cannot be carried out, the trust will fail unless it
appears that the intent of the settlor was more general than the original
particular purpose. The settlor's particular purpose should be found
to be a means to an end, rather than the end itself. However, general
charitable intent does not mean an intent to generally aid charity. For
purposes of application of the doctrine, it is sufficient that a settlor
wants to aid a general type or kind of charity."
Although most cases dealing with the problem of manifestation of
general charitable intent are decided upon their own facts, there are
some general rules which have been applied in the search for this in-
tent. A discussion of these rules should be prefaced with the observa-
tion that many courts today have taken a liberal attitude toward the
doctrine and seem to have had less difficulty than has the Washington
court in finding a general charitable intent.'
If the settlor has specifically provided in the will that his intent is
general, or that in case of difficulty or impossibility in applying the
fund or property to the particular purpose set forth in the will, his
trustee shall have the power to apply the property in a manner approxi-
mating the particular purpose, then the court should have no trouble
in finding a manifestation of general charitable intent." Such a test
was used in the Puget Sound case.' 0
15 Brief for Appellants, pp. 54-65, Puget Sound Nat'l Bank v. Easterday, 155 Wash.
Dec. 898, 350 P.2d 444 (1960).
16 Puget Sound Nat'l Bank v. Easterday, supra note 15, at 911, 350 P.2d at 451.
1' Ramsey v. City of Brook Field, 361 Mo. 857, 237 S.W2d 143 (1951).
Is FiscH, THE CY PRES DOCTRINE IN THE UNITED STATES § 4.02 (1950). See also
note 28 infra and accompanying text.
19 Gardner v. Sisson, 49 R.I. 504, 144 Atl. 669 (1929).
20 The Puget Sound case seems to be one of the few cases in which the settlor set
forth an express provision for the application of the cy pres doctrine.
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The fact that the testator has failed to provide for a gift over in the
event that the particular purpose cannot be carried out is an additional
indication of general charitable intent.2 However, this is merely evi-
dence of such intent and is not conclusive. For example, in Townsend
v. Charles Schalkenbach Home for Boys, Inc.,2 one of the two Wash-
ington cases in which the doctrine has been considered, the court re-
fused to apply cy pres even though there was no gift over.
The fact that the testator has left the bulk of his estate to various
charities, including the one which has failed, is also evidence of a gen-
eral charitable intent. 3 Had the settlor intended to aid only the par-
ticular charity which failed he would not have disposed of the bulk of
the remainder of his estate in a charitable manner. Therefore such a
settlor must have had a general charitable intent.
Another factor to be considered is whether the failure of the par-
ticular purpose occurred at the outset or at some later time. This might
be described as a policy consideration rather than evidence of general
charitable intent. If the failure occurs after the trust corpus has been
used for the particular purpose for a period of time and a resulting
trust were to arise upon failure of the particular charitable purpose,
there is the necessity of locating all of the persons entitled to the
settlor's estate. Finding such successors is an expensive, and in many
cases impossible task. This consideration has been suggested by
writers in the field24 and has been recognized by at least one court.2
However, on two previous occasions in this jurisdiction when the court
had to consider the application of the cy pres doctrine,26 the particular
purposes had failed subsequent to the bequest, but no mention was
made of the difficulty of locating the beneficiaries of the resulting
trusts.
The preceding discussion has centered around the problem of ascer-
taining the existence of general charitable intent in light of the instru-
ment creating the trust and the circumstances surrounding the creation
21In Ire Hendrick's Will, 1 Misc. 2d 904, 148 N.Y.S2d 245 (Sup. Ct. 1955), aff'd,
3 App. Div. 2d 890, 161 N.Y.S.2d 855 (1957), affd, 4 N.Y2d 744, 171 N.Y.S.2d 863,
148 N.E.2d 911 (1958). The rationale behind attaching significance to such a fact is
that the testator must have considered the possibility that the trust at some future time
might fail. Since he provided for no gift over, he must have intended that it be used
for other charitable purposes.
22 33 Wn.2d 255, 205 P.2d 345 (1949).
23 Union Methodist Episcopal Church v. Equitable Trust Co., 32 Del. Ch. 197, 83
A2d 111 (1951) ; Hardy v. Davis, 16 Ill. App. 2d 516, 148 N.E.2d 805 (1958) ; Rhode
Island Hospital Trust Co. v. Williams, 50 R.I. 385, 148 Atl. 189 (1929).24 FIscH, THE DocrmimE OF CY Pams IN THE UNrrrE STATES § 5.03 at 153 (1950);
4 ScoTT, TRUSTS § 399.3 (2d ed. 1956).
25 Christian Herald Ass'n Inc. v. First Nat'1 Bank, 40 So. 2d 563 (Fla. 1949).
26 See cases cited in note 6, spra.
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of the trust. Perhaps the most obvious answer to the problem is to
prevent it from arising." If draftsmen had been more articulate in
drafting the particular instruments, there would not be such a wealth
of litigation concerning general charitable intent.
When attempting to provide in a will that the settlor has manifested
a general charitable intent, the attorney should consider that the
Washington position on the manifestation of general charitable intent
calls for rather concrete evidence of such intent. For example, in
Townsend v. Charles Schalkenbach Home for Boys, Inc.,2" the settlor
provided that a portion of his property should be used to establish a
home for orphaned or abandoned working boys between the ages of
12 and 16. The project started off well, but later seemed to disinte-
grate. In 1943, after having been in operation for five years, the home
was temporarily closed with the permission of the court. The court,
when petitioned to terminate the trust, refused to apply the doctrine
of cy pres, holding that the testator had not evinced a broad charitable
intent, but had intended to aid the particular kind of home. The court
failed to consider a proposition that it later recognized in the Puget
Sound case, namely that the persons in the home were the beneficiaries,
not the home. Some other jurisdictions are not as strict in their de-
mands.29
The cy pres doctrine can be a valuable tool in providing for the
perpetuation of a charitable trust if the draftsman is apprised of the
legal criteria for the invocation of the doctrine. A poorly prepared
instrument not clearly manifesting a general charitable intent can bring
about wasteful litigation, and in some cases can result in a disposition
which the testator might never have considered. Sound draftsmanship
requires that the settlor's intent be precisely indicated in the creating
instrument.
PAUL A. WEBBER
27 The following might be set forth in the will if the client does not desire to have
the fund applied to another similar charitable purpose:
In the event that the particular purpose for which the trust has been created can
no longer be continued for any reason whatsoever, it is my desire that a resulting
trust arise in favor of the successors to my estate.
Such a provision does not violate the rule against perpetuities for that rule does not
apply to a resulting trust. 4 SCOTT, TRUSTS § 401.2 at 2867 (2d ed. 1956).
If the client does desire to have the fund applied for other charitable purposes in the
event that the particular purpose should fail, the following is suggested:
In the event that the particular purpose for which the trust has been created can
no longer be continued for any reason whatsoever, then it is my desire that the
fund/property be applied to another charitable purpose of a similar nature, such
charitable purpose to be determined by the trustees designated to administer the
trust, or their successors.
The rule against perpetuities doesn't preclude such a provision for the rule does not
[VOL. 36
